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THE POTENTIAL FOR REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUSTS IN SINGAPORE 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Since the Property Market Consultative Committee, which was appointed by the 
Government, recommended the introduction of Equity Real Estate Investment Trust (EREIT) 
in February 1986, a few empirical studies have been done to assess the impact of REITs on 
the Singapore property market.  Unfortunately REITs are yet to be introduced in Singapore.  
In view of the success of REITs and REIT-like instruments in the US, UK etc, this study sets 
out to investigate the potential for REITs in Singapore. It is found that in view of the 
disadvantages of direct property investment, investors in Singapore want access to larger 
properties, liquidity and reduced investment risk through unitised/securitised property 
vehicles such as REITs. 
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The buoyancy of the property market of Singapore between 1986 (ie since the last 
depression) and the first half of 1997 made Singaporeans euphoric about property 
investment in the country.  Several Singaporeans became wealthy during the decade 
through speculation in properties, especially residential properties, because of, inter alia, 
phenomenal growth in capital values.  According to figures from JLW Singapore (1997), 
average residential property value increased by 53%, commercial property value escalated 
by about 95% while industrial property value more than doubled between 1993 and 1996.  
While several people have profited through property speculation, many others have been 
discouraged from property investment because of the low initial yields of below 5% while the 
relatively high property prices have precluded many keen investors to result in the 
domination of the market by a handful of  major investors – banks and listed property 
companies.  Thus any measure which makes the highly priced properties accessible and 
attractive to many more investors is likely to benefit the property market as a whole. 
 
In view of this, the idea which was mooted by the Property Market Consultative Committee in 
February 1986 in relation to the introduction of Equity Real Estate Investment trusts 
(EREITs) to tackle the problems of unpredictable demand, excessive supply and loss of 
market confidence so as to revive the then depressed market seemed to be in the right 
direction. 
 
Unfortunately, no REIT-like instrument has been established yet in Singapore1.  Perhaps 
people were lulled by the spectacular performance of the property market between 1986 and 
19972 into being oblivious of the fact property investment is risky and that it is plagued with 
illiquidity, indivisibility, large capital outlay etc to constrain the inclusion of property as an 
asset class in institutional portfolios.  However, these drawbacks have been successfully 
circumvented by the creation of securitised and unitised property vehicles in the mature 
markets of USA and Australia.  Thus, this paper attempts to explore the viability of 
replicating the success of securitisation and unitisation through REITs in Singapore. 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Property securitisation has been the focus of several research studies over the years.  
Newell and Fife (1995) investigated the attitudes of major property investors to property 
securitisation by conducting two surveys in Australia in October 1991 and July 1992.  The 
study demonstrates a strong support for property securitisation in Australia.  The study 
further reveals that accessing higher value assets and achieving investment spread are as 
important to investors as the desire for liquidity. 
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According to McNeil (1995), and Downs and Hartzell (1995), the greatest advantages of 
investment in REITs are its liquidity and tax-transparency.  It must be cautioned however 
that tax-transparency could prove to be a serious disadvantage to REITs during a market 
depression as the “inflexible” conditions upon which it is granted forced several REITs in the 
US to be liquidated in 1973.  This does not mean that tax-transparency is not an advantage. 
However, trustees of REITs should note that tax-transparency could prove to be a two-
edged sword depending on the rules governing it. 
 
A significant finding of these two studies is that REITs perform more like equities than real 
estate.  This finding has been concurred in a study by Jones Lang Wooton (JLW), Sydney 
(1996) which reveals that the return of Listed Property Trusts (a type of REIT) in Australia is 
negatively correlated to direct property return.  However some researchers have 
controverted this finding.  Giliberto and Mengden (1996) find that REIT and direct property 
cash flows are positively correlated, and that any observed differences are caused mainly by 
the disparity in their valuation parameters.  Similarly, Mueller and Laposa (1996) analyse 
REIT’ characteristics by their property-type groups to conclude that the groups performance 
synchronizes with that of their respective underlying property-type (see also Ko et al; 1995; 
Eichholtz, 1997; Ghosh et al, 1996; Geltner, 1991).  The only conclusion which may be 
drawn from these conflicting findings is that al though REIT is supposed to be an investment 
in real property which is denominated in shares, it is a hybrid “instrument” which is neither 
real property nor equity investment.  This conclusion could be substantiated by the finding of 
McNeil (1995) that the average annual return for equity real estate investment trust (EREIT) 
– 15.59% - for the period 1978 to 1994 was higher than those for equity (13.80%) and real 
property (8.33%) as measured by the Standard and Poor 500 Stock Index (S&P500) and 
Russell-NCREIF Property Index (FRC); whereas the return for all REITs (12.43%) is slightly 
lower than the mean for the equity but higher than that of real property return (see figure 1; 
also JLW Advisory Sydney, 1996) 
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Figure 1: Risk and Return by Asset Class (1978 – 1994) 
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According to Jun Han and Youguo Liang (1995) comparing REITs return to the S&P500 
index overstates the performance of REITs relative to the stock market portfolio.  
Furthermore, they find that REITs return vary over time. 
 
The relatively high average annual REIT’s return over the years, especially in the early 
1990s, could be attributable to capital rate arbitrage that resulted from the then low cost of 
capital.  Thus, rising interest rates could reduce the potential for capital rate arbitrage to 
lower REIT’s return (see Stern and Redding, 1994; Chan, Hendershott and Sanders, 1990; 
Sanders, 1996).  Scherrer and Mathison (1996 a & b) have opined that as real estate prices 
in the US improve to raise the cost of REIT capital, and the return from other asset classes 
rises, REITs should seek new sources of capital and invest internationally to generate higher 
returns than could be obtained from solely investing in domestic real properties.  However, 
international diversification raises, among other things, the problem of exchange rate risk 
which, according to Scherrer and Mathison, could be mitigated by hedging.  It must be 
cautioned that the benefits of hedging are a function of the volatility indices of the relevant 
currencies (see Addae-Dapaah and Chua, 1996; Solnik, 1996) consequent on which 
hedging should be done only after a careful scrutiny of the costs and benefits. 
 
In the ASEAN region, however, the Malaysian Property Trust (MPT) was the first to be 
established.  Since the launch of the first MPT in 1989, three more listed MPTs3 have been 
launched.  Although modeled after the Australian Property Trust, the MPT is not tax-
transparent.  Kok and Khoo (1995) track the performance of the three listed MPTs against 
the stock market from January 1991 to March 1994 by calculating the Adjusted Sharpe 
Index, Treynor Index and Adjusted Jensen’s Ex-Post Alpha Index.  During this period, there 
was insignificant trading activity and price movement in the MPTs other than a sudden jump 
in prices in Decemeber 1993 which was shortly followed by a sharp fall to a level marginally 
above the original price.  Kok and Khoo (1995) conclude that MPTs perform worse than unit 
trusts, mutual funds and selected portfolios of stocks, and suggest that they are a poor form 
of investment. 
 
Azim (1994) gives a few possible reasons for the MPTs’ insignificant activity – lack of prime 
properties for the MPTs to invest in, the strict guidelines under which MPTs operate, and the 
failure of the investing public to understand that the MPT is generally a long-term 
investment. 
 
The recommendation of the Property Market consultative Committee (1986) with respect to 
the introduction of EREITs in Singapore has prompted a few literary works on the topic.  
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Seek (1987) comments that the problem of excessive supply (one of the major culprits of the 
1985-6 property market depression in Singapore) appears to be 
 
a symptom of a more fundamental problem – the lack of depth in the Singapore 
investment market, and property trusts, if accepted, can play a significant role in 
strengthening the property market.  The cyclical nature of any property market is not 
unusual but the particularly high volatility of the Singapore market suggests a strong 
presence of highly speculative elements and a lack of strong long term investment 
interests.  In more mature property markets, such as the UK, USA, and Australia, 
long term investors play a significant role in moderating the peaks and troughs of the 
market – they give the market more depth. 
 
In view of this, Seek (1987) proposes the setting up of property trusts similar to the LPTs in 
Australia which are almost identical to EREITs. 
 
Damon (1989) concurs that the introduction of property investment through tradable 
securities would widen the base of the local market, spread risk, release development capital 
more efficiently, attract overseas investors with possibly different investment profiles, 
encourage the growth of local fund management groups, and allow local investors wider 
access to international diversification. 
 
The liquidity benefits of securitisation of property investment have been well documented 
(see Bhasin et al, 1996). 
 
However, the contention that long term investors via REITs would play a significant role in 
moderating the peaks and the troughs in the property market may appear euphoric.  REITs 
could do nothing to ameliorate the property market depression of the 70s and the late 80s in 
the U.S.  REITs were rather a victim to the depression.  Similarly, the presence of long term 
investors in the UK could not forestall the damaging UK property market depression of the 
1974 and especially that of the late 80s to the mid 90s during which the capital value of the 
city of London office portfolios depreciated in the order of 25% per annum (see Mulhall, 
1992; Sailing, 1993).  Between July 1991 and July 1992, Land Securities’ share price fell by 
27%, British Land’s share price lost 44% of its value, while Slough Estates’ share value fell 
by more than 50% (Financial Times, 1991 and 1992)4.  These figures are more alarming 
than the 21.2% average annual fall in office property values in Singapore between the third 
quarter of 1981 (market peak) and the first quarter of 1986 (bottom of depression).   
Furthermore, LPTs in Australia could not thwart the ravages of the Australia’s property 
market depression of the late 80s to the mid 90s.  Therefore, it would appear to be a far cry 
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to presume that the introduction of REITs in Singapore could moderate the peaks and the 
troughs of the property market.  This contention may be reinforced by the fact that the 
existence of listed property companies (another indirect, albeit different, form of property 
investment) in Singapore could not ameliorate the recent property market depression.  The 
stocks of listed property companies were battered by the property market depression to 
precipitate a 55.13% fall in the Stock Exchange of Singapore Property Stock Index (SESPSI) 
by the end of 1998 (see figure 2).  The critical question is whether REITs in Singapore can 
withstand, and even forestall, property market depression(s) in the country when other 
(albeit dissimilar) indirect investment vehicles have failed. 
 
Property market cycles are a function of, inter alia, inelastic supply and volatile demand 
which cause the market to be in a perpetual disequilibrium.  Since REITs cannot eradicate 
these peculiarities of the property market, it would appear inconceivable for REITs to 
moderate the peaks and troughs of the property market.  In addition, since REITs are 
believed to be more akin to stock than real property investment, it could be argued that the 
introduction of REITs in Singapore could exacerbate the swings in the property market since 
investors can easily invest and disinvestment.  Similarly Damon’s (1989) proposal that the 
Single Property Trust is the most suitable for Singapore is questionable as overseas 
experience show that multi-asset trust vehicles are potentially more beneficial. 
 
In addition to replicating the above findings, Koh et al (1991) feel that the existing framework 
for unit trusts in Singapore could be used for REITs.  They further suggest that governmental 
and institutional participation in REITs, coupled with permitting the use of one’s savings in 
the Central Provident Fund (CPF) – the equivalence of Social Security in the West – for 
investment in REITs would boost the success of REITs in Singapore.  Certainly 
governmental sponsorship (in any form) of REITS will more than guarantee its success.  
However one may question the rationale for such preferential treatment which was not 
accorded to unit trusts and property companies.  Furthermore, even though the release of 
CPF savings for REITs will undoubtedly encourage Singaporeans to invest in REITs, most 
pension consultants may be horrified by the utilization of one’s retirement funds for an 
investment which offers no guarantees.  However, the desirability of employing CPF savings 
for risky investment(s) is beyond the scope of this paper. 
 
Tsan (1995) investigates the financial feasibility of REITs in Singapore to conclude that REIT 
is an attractive investment vehicle for Singaporeans.  The variables in his model are property 
price indices for Urban Redevelopment Authority (URA) and Jones Lang Wootton 
(Singapore), and the Stock Exchange of Singapore All-Share and All-Properties indices.  It 
must be noted that the use of indices from different sources could be problematic.  
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Furthermore, the listed property companies whose share prices constitute the All-Properties 
index engage in  business activities which are not related to properties.  The law governing 
the property companies are likely to be different from those of REITs.  Thus using the above 
parameters as a proxy for REITs may leave something more to be desired. 
 
 
A BRIEF SURVEY OF SINGAPORE PROPERTY MARKETS 
 
The performance of the Singapore property market (all sectors), the office market and the 
property stock market from 88Q1 to 98Q4 is depicted by figure 2. It is evident from figure 2 
that both the property market and the office market synchronize with the property stock 
market in their cyclical movements. While the property market peaked in 96Q2, the property 
stock market peaked in 97Q1. By the end of 1998, the property market index (URAPPI in 
figure 2) had fallen by 43.88% from its peak in 96Q2. In contrast, the index for the office 
market (URAOPI in figure 2) , with a stock of 5,733,000m2  as of 98Q4, fell by 38.77% over 
the same period whereas the SESPSI plummeted (from its peak in 97Q1) by 55.13% by 
98Q4. 
 
PROFILE OF PROPERTY INVESTORS IN SINGAPORE 
 
An appreciation of the profile of investors is a pre-requisite to ascertaining the potential 
success of REITs and/or any securitised or unitised investment vehicle(s) in Singapore.  
Banks, some government bodies and public-listed property companies are the main 
investors in commercial properties in Singapore. In contrast to the west, institutions 
(insurance companies and pension funds) are noticeably absent from the property market.  
CPF, the only superannuation fund in Singapore, invests in property indirectly through the 
members withdrawal of their savings for the purchase of properties.  On a direct basis, CPF 
invest in overseas properties through the Government of Singapore Investment Corporation. 
 
Furthermore, most of the public-listed property companies and some large, established 
private companies such as Far East Organisation and Kuok Singapore are active in 
residential developments which are sold on completion for short-term profit.  Individuals and 
smaller companies are the main investors in residential properties predominantly but not 
exclusively for owner-occupation. 
 
As Jurong Town Corporation and the Housing Development Board (both of which are 
statutory bodies) own most of the industrial properties, only a small proportion of industrial 
properties are owned by private companies and individuals mostly for owner-occupation. 
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Figure 2: Property and Property Stock Indices (1988-1998)
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ACCESS TO COMMERCIAL PROPERTIES – SMALL INVESTORS 
 
The only route to commercial property ownership by the small retail investors is via the 
Strata Title System Commercial properties which are in multiple ownership                    
include Golden Mile Complex, Lucky Plaza, Far East Shopping Centre and Kim Seng 
Shopping Centre.  The supply of good quality strata titled commercial properties is very 
limited.  The most recently available Grade B office space was two 44-storey towers of 
Suntec City which were strata-titled on a floor-by-floor basis, each floor of an average size of 
10,000 sq ft (930 sq m).  The average sale price o $1,800 psf ($19,375 psm) which 
translated to an absolute average of $18 million was not affordable to the “ordinary man-in-
the-street”.  It was not surprising therefore that one tower was predominantly purchased by 
multinational corporations such as Hyundai, BASF and some financial institutions for owner-
occupation, while the other tower was bought by local and foreign companies mainly for 
investment.  Whilst strata-title is a solution to the lumpiness of property by giving access to 
ownership on a divided scale, it has its limitations.  The system is based on divided 
ownership but the cost of management and maintenance of the building structure and 
common parts is apportioned to the owners by a formula laid down by legislation (see the 
Strata Title Act).  Furthermore, small investors may indirectly invest in commercial properties 
by purchasing shares of property companies which are listed on the Stock Exchange of 
Singapore (SES). 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
The study is based on a survey of 153 (i.e. about 22%) randomly selected institutional 
investors.  Institutional investors were targeted for the survey mainly because they are 
relatively more knowledgeable about REITs and other modes of indirect property investment 
and thus, could provide a more informed response to the survey which addressed the 
following key issues: 
 
  existing direct and indirect property investment portfolio; 
  advantages and disadvantages of direct property investment; 
  general attitude towards REITs and indirect property 
 
The sample of 153 institutions is composed of the Banks, Life Assurance/Insurance 
companies, securities companies, Fund management companies, Property developers, 
Corporate entities and others such as property and financial advisers.  Questionnaire survey 
forms were sent to the institutions by facsimile and/or mail, followed by a telephone call to 
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ensure that the interviewees had received the questionnaire and to complement the 
postal/facsimile survey with telephone survey.  The response rate of the survey which was 
conducted from 28 April 1997 to 30 May 1997 was 41.2% (i.e. 63 respondents). 
PROFILE OF RESPONDENTS 
 
The respondents to the survey represent a broad spectrum of reputable institutional 
investors (see table 1) who are managing assets of varying magnitude (see table 1). The 
total value of portfolio managed by the respondents is approximately S$63 billion. 
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Table 1 
 
PROFILE OF RESPONDENTS 
 
ASSETS MANAGED (S$M) 
RESPONDENT <50m 
% 
51m – 100 
% 
101 – 250 
% 
251 – 500 
% 
501 – 1000 
% 
>1000 
% 
Total 
% 
Property 
Developer 
2 1 1 2  - 6 
Fund Management 
Co. 
3 4 2 2 1 1 13 
Securities Co. 9 2 5 9 - - 25 
Insurance Co. - - - - 3 10 13 
Offshore Bank - - - - 6 4 10 
Lending Bank - - - - - 3 3 
Merchant Bank - - - - - 3 3 
Investment Bank - - - - 3 3 6 
Investment Co. 7 2 1 1 - - 11 
Other Company 8 1 1 - - - 10 
        
Total 29 10 10 14 13 24 100 
 
 
Source: Based on authors’ survey.
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It must be noted, however, that the majority of the respondents (68%) do not directly invest 
in real property.  Of the remaining 32% respondents about 16%, 5% and 11% directly invest 
between 1% and 10%, 11% and 20%, and 50% and 100% of their assets respectively in real 
property.  Among those in the 50-100% range, all but one allocate 100% of their assets in 
real property.  It is not surprising to note that these group of respondents are property 
developers and property companies.  Furthermore, the survey results show that about 37% 
of the respondents can (under their current investment guidelines) invest in indirect property 
vehicles while 30% can invest in derivatives.  Figure 3 details this group’s participation in 
indirect property vehicles and derivatives. 
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 Figure 3  -  Participation in Indirect Property Vehicles/Derivatives 
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REAL PROPERTY AS AN INVESTMENT MEDIUM 
 
The respondents’ assessment of the relative attractiveness of direct property investment is 
presented in figure 4. 
 
 Figure 4  -  Relative Attractiveness of Direct Real Property Investment 
Hedge against inflation    56.6%       23.4% 20.0% 
  
Prospective performance            51.7%  25.0% 23.3% 
  
Stability of income 48.3%  31.7% 20.0% 
  
Ability to outperform via 
stock selection 
36.7%  35.0% 28.3% 
  
Portfolio diversification 31.7%  45.0% 23.3% 
  
Running yield 31.7%  31.7% 36.6% 
  
Dealing costs 25.0%  36.6% 38.4% 
  
Management costs 25.5%  26.7% 48.3% 
  
Capital outlay 23.3%  26.7% 48.3% 
  
Liquidity 11.7%  23.3% 65.0% 
  
                                  
                                  0%    10%    20%    30%    40%    50%   60%   70%    80%    90%     100% 
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Source:  Authors’ Survey 
17 
 
With a relatively low annual inflation rate of about 3% vis-à-vis the spectacular performance 
of the property market especially between 1992-96 (see introduction) and a geometric 
average annual exponential capital appreciation rate of 12.77%7 for the period 1980 – 96 
inclusive, it is not unexpected that inflation hedging and prospective performance potential of 
direct property investment rank highly as a merit.  Similarly, the finding that the problem of 
liquidity, capital outlay and management cost significantly cause direct property investment 
to be relatively unattractive (see figure 4) confirms common knowledge.  Furthermore the 
respondents’ acknowledgement that the running yield (usually below 5% annually) makes 
direct property investment relatively unattractive while prospective performance makes 
property investment attractive would appear paradoxical.  However the apparent 
contradiction could be explained by the relatively high appreciation of property values, 
especially over the past few years (see introduction), which more than compensates for the 
relatively low running yields to give credence to respondents optimism.  In addition, a long 
term annual average redemption yield of 16.7% per annum (based on the computed average 
exponential property value appreciation of 12.7% over the past 17 years and in initial yield of 
4% per annum) is good enough to justify the respondents optimism about prospective 
performance of direct property investment. 
 
 
NEED FOR PROPERTY SECURITISATION/UNITISATION 
 
According to the respondents to the survey, securitisation/unitisation is primarily needed to: 
 
(a) facilitate “access” to larger properties (56.7%); 
(b) reduce risk in property investment (i.e. price hedging) (55.0%); 
(c) promote liquidity (55.0%); and 
(d) spread risk (i.e. sector hedging) (43.3%) 
Furthermore, whereas 42.9% of the respondents think that these indirect property 
investment vehicles will probably be a substitute for direct property investment, 52.41% of 
them think otherwise.  Only 4.7% think that the indirect property investment vehicles will 
definitely be a substitute for direct investment in property.  The attitude of the portion of 
respondents, who currently invest directly in property, towards the indirect property 
investment vehicles is similar to that of the whole group of respondents.  Of those who 
currently hold direct property investments, 57.5% will continue to invest directly in property; 
36.5% will probably stop, while 6% will stop, investing directly in property if suitable, liquid, 
tax-efficient indirect property investment vehicles existed.  These figures should not  be 
construed to portend a dismal prognosis for indirect property investment vehicles in 
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Singapore.  The decision not to substitute indirect property investment vehicles for direct 
property investment is an interim tactical move.  According to those who will stick to direct 
property investment, they will rather wait, monitor and convince themselves of the stability 
and relative attractiveness of any indirect property market, as measured by liquidity and 
performance, before substituting it for direct investment in property. 
According to the results of the survey, 93% of all the respondents are very receptive to, and 
welcome the introduction of, REITs in Singapore.  Only 7% of the respondents are sceptical 
of the success of REITs in Singapore.  This minority group is not certain of the sufficiency of 
demand for REITs.  This pessimism is, however, not buttressed by any market research. 
Figure 5 presents the types of securitised vehicles that appeal to investors. 
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Figure 6: TYPE OF SECURITISED VEHICLES THAT APPEAL TO  INVESTORS 
 
 
 
 Figure 5  - Types of Scuritised Vehicles that would Interest Investors 
Geographically-focused    55.1%      28.3%     16.6% 
  
Spread of property 
Assets 
          50.0%       31.7%    18.3% 
  
Sector-focused   41.7%  40.0%       18.3% 
  
Public-listed property co.  
 40.0% 
 36.7%           23.3% 
  
Specialist  35.0%  41.7%           23.3% 
  
Open-end property fund        26.7%  43.3%   30.0% 
  
Closed-end property 
fund 
   20.0%  43.3%   36.7% 
  
Single property asset   18.4%  40.0%   41.6% 
  
                                  
                                  0%    10%    20%    30%    40%    50%   60%   70%    80%    90%     100% 
 
 
 
         Interesting                  Neutral                     Uninteresting 
 
 
Source:  Authors’ Survey 
 
20 
 
It is obvious from figure 5 that REITs which have portfolios which are diversified 
geographically (ie. internationally) to include a variety of property types would be more 
appealing to investors than any others.  The relative smallness of the property market of 
Singapore significantly constrains diversification of direct real property investment in the 
country.  It is therefore reasonable for astute and potential investors in REITs to desire 
international-portfolio trusts.  This is in consonance with the proposal of Scherrer and 
Mathison (1996) that REITs should invest internationally to generate a relatively higher 
return than can be realised from purely domestic real property investment.  Furthermore; it 
could be deduced from figure 6 that a single property asset REIT would be quite undesirable 
to potential investors.  This finding negates Damon’s (1989) proposal that “the Single 
Property Trust was the most suitable for Singapore’. 
 
According to the results of the survey, all the listed factors (see figure 6) which may affect 
the success of REIT are important.  However, the respondents to the survey consider the 
quality of properties in a REIT’s portfolio to be prejudicial to its success.  Similarly, liquidity 
and the company’s management ability are considered to be critical determinants of a 
REIT’s success in Singapore (see figure 6).  The fact that 66.7% of the respondents 
consider the use of CPF as a major determining factor of success implies that the success of 
REITs in Singapore could be seriously impaired unless the government allows CPF 
members to use their CPF savings to invest in REITs.  As far as Singaporeans are 
concerned, the ability to use CPF savings for investment in REITs would tantamount to the 
government’s sponsorship of REITs.  Apart from boosting the morale of the investors, it will 
enable Singaporean investors to invest in REITs without having to sacrifice a portion of their 
spendable income.  This has been the foundation of the success of house ownership in, and 
the catalyst for the buoyancy of the property market of, Singapore.  It will certainly 
considerably promote the success of REITs. 
 
Even though taxes are relatively low in Singapore (the highest income tax rate being 28% 
while corporate tax is 26%) the respondents to the survey consider favourable tax 
treatments as a relatively important success factor for REITs.  Damon (1989) warned that 
the strict regulations on which tax transparency is based could undermine REITs in 
Singapore during adverse economic conditions as evidenced by the US experience.  
However, this fear would appear to be unfounded because during the 1986 property market 
depression of Singapore, the government reacted quickly to forestall foreclosures to pre-
empt the collapse of business entities.  At the time of writing, the government has taken 
measures (including relaxation of some rules) to ensure that the current over-supply of 
property and currency turmoil do not undermine the property market.  Thus, one may safely 
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conclude that favourable taxation would enhance, rather than negate, the success of REITs 
in Singapore.  In addition, it is worth noting that even though public listing is a success 
factor, it is almost at the bottom of the scale of success factors.  Similarly, volatility is 
relatively insignificant.  Perhaps, the respondents, who are seasoned investors, have 
accepted risk as an inevitable function of investment. 
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Figure 6: SUCCESS CRITERIA FOR REITs 
 
Choice of 
property/ies 
78.3% 18.4%  3.3% 
     
Liquidity 76.7% 20.0%  3.3% 
     
The company’s 
Management 
ability 
76.7% 20.0%  3.3% 
     
Use of CPF funds 66.7% 25.0%  8.3% 
     
Tax treatment 65.0% 28.3%  6.7% 
     
Investment 
management 
costs 
61.7% 28.3%  10.0% 
     
Public-listing 53.3% 30.0%  16.7% 
     
Volatility 37.7% 54.0%  8.3% 
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As for as managing REITs assets is concerned, the respondents are of the opinion that 
management should devolve upon, in descending order, specialist fund management 
houses (26.8%), merchant/investment banks (23.5%), life assurance/insurance companies 
(16.8%), property companies (16.8%) and property consultants (16.1%).  It is almost 
paradoxical that inspite of all property consultants expertise in property management, they 
are the least favoured for managing REITs assets.  It could be that the respondents consider 
REITs to be more a financial instrument than real property investment and therefore deem 
fund managers to be more suitable than property consultants to manage REITs.  This may 
imply that the success of REITs in Singapore could spell disaster for property consultants 
(by taking business away from them) unless property consultants can prove to REITs 
trustees that they, property consultants, are knowledgeable in, and capable of, managing 
financial instruments and therefore REITs.  It would appear that expertise in fund 
management would be vital for the survival of property consultants when REIT is 
successfully implemented in Singapore. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The study has shown that there is an overwhelming support for the introduction of REITs in 
Singapore.  The majority of the respondents (93%) are certain that REITs will be well 
received by the investing community of Singapore.  Although the sample size of the survey 
is relatively small, the survey targeted the possible REIT “market movers”.  Furthermore it 
was discovered during the survey that the respondents are very well informed about REITs.  
Thus, it may be concluded that the findings of the study are reliable albeit the relative 
smallness of the sample size. 
 
Among the most important determinants of the success of REITs in Singapore is the use of 
CPF savings to invest in REITs and tax concession for REITs.  This implies that REITs must 
perforce be “Approved REITs” (ie. they must be approved by the CPF Board).  One of the 
criteria for approval is that the trust should have paid dividends for the proceeding three 
financial years to the date of application for approval.  Whether this rule would be relaxed for 
REITs to be “Approved REITs” from the very inception is a matter for negotiation.  If approval 
is not given at the inception, the demand for REITs stock would come solely from 
institutional investors who, according to the study, are receptive to REITs.  After establishing 
themselves in the first few years, REITs should easily achieve approved status to enable 
private Singaporeans to use their CPF savings to invest in REITs.  Though public listing is 
almost at the bottom of the success criteria scale (see figure 6), it is imperative for achieving 
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“Approved” REITs status as well as ensuring liquidity which is a critical determinant of 
success. 
 
It suffices to state that a conducive and efficient regulatory environment exists under the 
supervision of Monetary Authority of Singapore and the Stock Exchange of Singapore to 
ensure the smooth operation of future REITs in Singapore. 
 
Since the proposal of the Property Market Consultative Committee (1986) implies the 
implementation of EREITs which are a replica of the US model of portfolio based, tax 
transparent trusts, it may be safely concluded that REITs would be accorded tax 
transparency in Singapore. The granting of tax transparency status (which is the key 
attractive feature of REITs) to REITs will accord to the government’s drive to make 
Singapore the financial hub of South-east Asia.  However, we must remember the old adage 
“noblesse oblige”.  Tax transparency warrants REITs to comply with certain legal 
requirements.  It was reported in the Straits Times (1999) that the Real Estate Development 
Association of Singapore (Redas) has held a few meetings with the Monetary Authority of 
Singapore (MAS) to discuss REITs in Singapore.  The only statement that MAS has made 
about when REITs will be introduced in Singapore is “MAS is currently finalising the 
regulatory framework for property funds.  Details will be announced when this is finalised”  
(The Straits Times, 1999). 
 
Given the strong inclination of Singapore towards the U.S. it is likely that the legal framework 
for REITs in Singapore will be similar to what exists in the US8.  This means that REITs in 
Singapore will have to satisfy the Asset, Income and Distribution Requirements9 to qualify for 
favourable tax treatment.  
 
In addition to liquidity, favourable tax treatment and sound regulatory environment, a REIT 
must offer “reasonable” annual return to appeal to shareholders/unitholders. Unfortunately, 
Singapore is notorious low running yields of between 3% and 5%. This could pose a serious 
problem if prospective investors require higher yields. However, low initial yields could be 
balanced by a relatively high long term exponential mean annual capital appreciation of 
about 13% which is tax free as there is no capital gains tax in Singapore.  
The Honourable Lim Hng Kiang (Singapore’s then Minister for National Development) said: 
 
 As Singaporeans have always been interested in property investments, pension 
property funds will be well received by them.  However, the private sponsors must 
decide whether or not there is sufficient demand to launch pension property funds in 
Singapore (Lianhe Zaobao, 1997). 
25 
 
It would appear that the private sector is ready for the introduction of REITs in Singapore.  
All the interested parties are waiting for MAS to come out with the regulatory framework for 
the launch of REITs in Singapore. 
 
 
NOTES: 
 
1. It was reported in the Straits Times of Thursday, 4 January 1999 that Singapore’s 
first REIT might be launched towards the end of 1999. 
 
2. The euphoria about property investment in Singapore has been dispelled since the 
second half of 1997 when the ravages of the South East Asian currency crisis took its 
toll on the weakened Singapore property market.  Since the 1996 property market 
peak, average property values have fallen by about 44%. 
 
3. The property trusts in Malaysia are Arab-Malaysian First Property Trust, First 
Malaysian Property Trust, Amanah Harta TANAH PNB and Mayban Property.  It has 
been acknowledged by the Malaysian market and the relevant authorities that the 
property trusts market has been in active, and that current legislation does not allow 
the trusts to be aggressive.  
4. Although these figures relate to property company shares, which are different from 
REITs, they are a potent negation of the contention that long-term investors play a 
significant role in moderating the peaks and troughs of the market.  Since long term 
investors via property companies could not counteract the property market 
depression, it would appear inconceivable to argue that long term investors via 
REITs could moderate the peaks and troughs of the property market. 
 
5. The Singapore private property market (for which indices are constructed) is made  
up of 164,000 private residential units and 11,612,880m2 of office, retail and industrial 
space.  The value of the market is calculated to be about S$300 billion as of the end 
of 1998. 
 
 
6. According to available figures from the Stock Exchange of Singapore, there are 22 
listed property companies.  The market capitalisation of the mainboard (Singapore 
incorporated / S$ traded) property companies was about S$15.2 billion as of the end 
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of January 1999 (see SES Journal, February 1999).  At the time of writing, S$1.7080 
= US$1.00/ 
 
 
 
7. The exponential mean annual capital appreciation was computed from the property 
price index compiled by the Urban Redevelopment Authority of Singapore.  The 
Singapore Private Property Price Index (quarterly) compiled by the URA is presently 
the only index available that measures price changes of various types of properties 
over time and is generated using median transaction prices and the fixed base 
weighted Laspeyres formula: 
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 where IOn = Property price index for current period n compared to base 
    period 0 (base year: 1999) 
 
Pni = Average selling price ($/m2) of a single property of type “I” in  
current period n 
 
            Poi = Average selling price ($/m2) of a single property of type “I” in   
base period 0 
 
            Q0I = Quantity of property type I sold in base period 0 
 
  PoiQ0i = Transacted value of property type “I” in the base period  
(weighting factor) 
   
The index is a price relative of the current price per square metre of a type of 
property compared with that in the base year, 1990.  The average selling price used 
to compute the index based on the fixed base weighted Laspeyres formula is the 
median instead of the mean.  The index is generated from the transaction prices of 
properties in the Caveats lodged with the Registry of Titles and Deeds (in the 
Singapore context, a caveat is usually lodged by the purchaser to protect his/her 
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interest soon after an option to purchase a property is exercised or a sale/purchase 
agreement is signed). 
 
8. The requirements which REITs in the US should satisfy to qualify for favourable tax 
treatment are as follows: 
 
Asset Requirements 
 At least 75 percent of the value of a REIT’s assets must consist of real estate 
assets, cash, and government securities. 
 Not more than 5 percent of the value of the assets may consist of the 
securities of any one issuer if the securities are not includable under the 75 
percent test. 
 A REIT may not hold more than 10 percent of the outstanding voting 
securities of any one issuer if those securities are not includable under the 75 
percent test. 
 
Income Requirements 
 At least 95 percent of the entity’s gross income must be derived from 
dividends, interest, rents, or gains from the sale of certain assets. 
 At least 75 percent of gross income must be derived from rents, interest on 
obligations secured by mortgages, gains from the sale of certain assets, or in 
come attributable to investments in other REITs. 
 Not more than 30 percent of the entity’s gross income can be derived from 
sale or disposition of stock or securities held for less than six months or real 
property held for less than four years other than property involuntarily 
converted or foreclosed on. 
 
Distribution Requirements 
 
 Distributions to shareholders must equal or exceed the sum of 95 percent of 
REIT taxable income. 
 
9. The Asian countries do not have much to offer Singapore as far as REIT is 
concerned.  The Japanese authorities are currently formulating regulations for REIT.  
Securitisation of real estate is gaining currency in Japan.  In the summer of 1998, 
Meiji-era Yamato Seimei Building in Central Tokyo was successfully securitised.  
Furthermore, Sumitomo Realty and Development Company has announced its 
decision to securitise some of its commercial buildings while Fukoku Mutual Life 
28 
Insurance Co, the Japan Development Bank, Nomura Securities Co. and a real 
estate firm are co-operating to fund the construction of a building through 
securitization of real estate. 
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